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Abstract 
A number of industries including aerospace, telecom and automotive incur warranty and product return costs due to product malfunctions in 
service, which can also negatively impact customer satisfaction and loyalty. Product failures, which occur in service, are often caused by root 
causes at design or at manufacturing phases. Therefore a novel inter-loop modelling framework is needed which takes information from 
different phases to determine root causes and corrective actions. This goes beyond current intra-loop methods such as design optimization, 
statistical process control etc., which uses information from a single phase to address failures in the same phase. However, inter-loop modelling 
poses the challenge of integrating heterogeneous data from different phases of lifecycle with product and process models to determine failure 
root causes and corrective actions. To deal with failures in service, this paper proposes Closed-loop Lifecycle Modelling approach, specifically 
integrating information from service and design. Related work on fault diagnosis and corrections is also reviewed in the context of intra and 
inter loops of product lifecycle. 
The proposed methodology addresses root cause analysis (RCA) of service failures caused due to dimensional variations of product features. 
RCA identifies critical geometric features of internal components, which affects dimensional variations of product features. This is done by 
integrating warranty data from service to design models such as CAD, Geometric Dimensioning & Tolerancing (GD&T) etc. Steps of the 
methodology include: (i) identification of faulty product features from the Ishikawa diagram of the failure reported in warranty; (ii) variation 
simulation analysis of geometric features of internal components; (iii) determination of critical geometric features affecting faulty product 
feature via surrogate modelling of dimensional variations; and (iv) analyzing sensitivity of faulty product features on critical geometric 
features. The proposed Design-Service inter loop is demonstrated by an industrial case study of automotive ignition switch and ‘Sticky Key’ 
service failure. RCA of ‘Sticky Key’ issue identifies critical geometric features and their sensitivity in affecting the faulty product features, 
which cause the failure. 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the International Scientific Committee of “24th CIRP Design Conference” in the person of 
the Conference Chairs Giovanni Moroni and Tullio Tolio. 
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1. Introduction 
Product failures in service such as warranty and No-Fault-
Found (NFF) failures result in significant costs of warranty 
and product returns in industries such as automotive, 
aerospace, mobile phones etc. [1][2]. NFF-related problems 
negatively affect customer satisfaction in terms of product 
safety and reliability, and contribute to increased product life-
cycle cost [1]. Therefore, root cause analysis (RCA) and 
corrective actions (CA) of product failures in service is 
important.  
In the service phase, unexpected product malfunctions 
whose root cause cannot be diagnosed after service checks are 
categorized as No-Fault-Found (NFF) failures. Service 
failures are often caused by root causes at design or at 
manufacturing phases. For example, erroneous 
characterization of customer attributes during early product 
development increases the risk of unexplored interactions 
during the design phase [2]. Such interactions may go 
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unnoticed by designers and increase the risk of failure regions 
inside defined design tolerances (in-tolerance failures).  In the 
manufacturing phase, one of the reasons, why unexpected 
challenges might arise is due to process capability being 
commonly not taken into consideration concurrently with 
product and process design.  Thus, the impact that process 
variations have on final product quality may cause a product’s 
non-conformance. The lack of concurrency demands the need 
to move from just part and product tolerancing (driven by 
seminal concept of part interchangeability) to simultaneous 
parts/product and process tolerancing (process-oriented 
tolerancing) [3]. 
Root causes of service failures are often in design and 
manufacturing. Therefore, to address root causes of service 
failures, it is necessary to develop analytical methods based on 
inter-loop modelling which integrates heterogeneous data 
from different phases of lifecycle with product and process 
models. This research proposes a Closed-loop Lifecycle 
Modelling approach to deal with service failures by 
specifically integrating warranty data with design models. The 
remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
describes the framework Closed-loop Lifecycle Modelling. 
Related work on fault diagnosis and adjustments are reviewed 
in the context of the proposed framework. Section 3 presents 
root cause analysis of service failures specifically linking 
warranty data with design models. This is followed by an 
industrial case study in Section 4. The paper ends with 
remarks on future work in Section 5. 
2. Closed-loop Lifecycle Modelling 
The loops of self-resilient production system are classified as 
intra-loop and inter-loop based on availability of data from 
same or different phases of PLM respectively. Fig. 1 shows 
the closed-loop framework. The intra loop refers to 
integration of data with product and process models from 
same phase of PLM such as SPC which uses manufacturing 
data for monitoring purposes. The inter-loop refers to 
integration of data with product or process models obtained 
from more than one phase of PLM such as addressing service 
failures using the approach proposed by Mannar et al. [2], 
which uses data from manufacturing and service phase of 
PLM. 
 
Fig. 1. Framework for Closed-loop Lifecycle Modelling 
2.1. Intra loops in PLM 
  In design phase, product simulation generates data on design 
parameters (DPs) satisfying pre-defined functional 
requirements (FRs). Methodologies have been developed to 
enable design changes and optimization by modelling the 
relationship between critical DPs to FRs and critical process 
variables (PVs) to DPs [4,5]. 
  In manufacturing phase, the intra-loop consists of continuous 
data of DPs and PVs obtained using in-line and/or off-line 
measurements of products and processes during production.     
The intra-loop in manufacturing is used to addresses out-of-
tolerance 6-sigma failures using SPC techniques [6,7]. The 
monitoring capability can be further integrated with process 
models to enhance the intra-loop capability of the production 
systems for fault diagnosis and adjustments [8]. 
  Intra-loop in service consists of warranty data and failures 
data which are analyzed to send feedback to OEMs for setting 
economic warranty reimbursements to customers, estimating 
field reliability of products and changing design to address 
service failures [9]. Warranty data is also used to improve 
performance of service centres by generating pre-alerting 
rules to diagnose product failures from customer complaints 
[10]. 
2.2. Inter loops in PLM 
The Design-Manufacturing inter-loop integrates 
information from manufacturing with design to evaluate and 
improve diagnosability and adjustability of products thus 
reducing test time of failures in case of uncertain faults [11]. 
In Manufacturing-Service inter-loop, the Functional 
Region Localization (FRL) methodology [2] integrates 
manufacturing and service information to identify and isolate 
in-tolerance fault regions in DPs. Prakash et al. [12] determine 
the necessary process adjustment to reduce number of 
products falling in NFF fault region.  
For Design-Service inter-loop, there is need for analytical 
method to identify root causes of service failures by 
integrating warranty failures with design models. Shrouti et 
al. [13] maps service failures in mechanical assemblies with 
faulty FRs such as gaps or contacts between internal 
components. Simulation of geometric DPs is done to model 
variation in FRs. The current research extends this work by (i) 
demonstrating the use of fault trees to identify faulty FRs for a 
given service failures; and (ii) identifying critical DPs related 
to faulty FRs; and (iii) developing analytical surrogate model 
linking faulty FRs as a response of critical DPs. Corrective 
actions via design adjustments such as mean shift and 
tolerance reduction of DPs will significantly benefit from the 
information on critical DPs and analytical surrogate model of 
faulty FRs. Section 3 describes a methodology of root cause 
analysis (RCA) of service failures by integrating customer 
complaints and parts replaced information from warranty with 
design models such as Ishikawa diagram, CAD, GD&T and 
variation simulation analysis. RCA identifies critical 
geometric DPs whose dimensional variations results faulty 
FRs. Sensitivity of faulty FRs on critical DPs is also 
determined. Fault Corrective action by tolerance re-allocation 
depends on identification of critical DPs and sensitivity 
analysis to minimize dimensional variations in faulty FRs. 
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3. Methodology 
    The proposed methodology focusses on addressing direct or 
consequential failures caused by dimensional variations in 
rigid body assemblies. Failures manifest as violation of 
functionality which depends on dimensional behavior of 
Functional Requirements (FRs) such as gaps, contacts etc. 
FRs are achieved in product design by geometric Design 
Parameters (DPs) whose dimensional variations affect FRs.  
When FRs do not satisfy the specification for normal 
functioning of the product, failures occur. For example, if a 
clearance or contact between two mating surfaces is required 
for normal functioning, then interference between the two 
surfaces will cause failure. The proposed methodology first 
identifies FRs which are responsible for the faulty 
functionality. Next, critical DPs whose dimensional variations 
result faulty FRs, are determined and sensitivity analysis is 
done between FRs and critical DPs. Identification and 
sensitivity analysis of critical DPs is the key input required for 
tolerance re-allocation to correct the failure. The steps of the 




Fig. 2. Root Cause Analysis of Product Service Failures                     
caused by Dimensional Variations 
 
The steps of the proposed methodology are detailed as 
follows: 
Step I: Identify faulty Functional Requirements- 
   Warranty data, obtained from service agents such as dealers, 
call centres etc., is analyzed to determine customer complaints 
and parts being replaced by dealers. A Pareto analysis of 
frequency of customer complaints or cost of replaced parts is 
performed [13] to determine critical issues and related 
components that require Root Cause Analysis (RCA) and 
Corrective Actions (CA). Next, Ishikawa diagram of the 
failure is referred to link customer complaints with faulty 
product features, which are further translated to dimensional 
FRs such as gaps, contacts etc. from CAD models. Besides, a 
sample of failed parts is subjected inspection and 
measurement to confirm that faulty FRs, which are identified 
in the previous step, do not conform specifications of normal 
functionality in the sample. 
Step II: Conduct Variation Simulation of Design Parameters 
& faulty Functional Requirements-  
  Simulation of dimensional variation of DPs and faulty FRs 
are done in the following steps: 
x Model DPs as variational features & setup Assembly 
Constraints- The Datum Flow Chain (DFC) [13] is applied 
to determine all sub-assemblies and parts, from which 
functional geometric features are identified based on 
nominal CAD model of the parts.  DPs are modelled as the 
planar and cylindrical features. Variations based on 
dimensional torelancing will be applied to the DPs to 
generate FRs. Next Assembly Constraints are introduced 
between the DPs to define mating surfaces.  
 
x Simulate DPs & FRs by Variation Response Method 
(VRM) - Variational geometric features (DPs) and 
Assembly Constraints, specified in the previous step forms 
input to VRM [14], which generates geometric variations 
of DPs based on Monte-Carlo Simulation. Optimal 
assembly configuration for a set of DPs is determined and 
FRs are measured as clearance or interference between 
pre-defined inspection points on the planar or cylindrical 
features. Co-ordinates of inspection points are expressed 
in the global co-ordinate system of the nominal CAD 
model using 4 4u homogenous transformation matrix, 
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where, R0i  is 3 3u rotation matrix and p0i is 3 1u
displacement vector.  
If P0 and Pi are positions of the inspection point in global 
and assembly co-ordinate frames respectively then, 
Pi = T0i P0                                                                         (2) 
      and 
      10 0
 i iP T P                                                                        (3) 
SVA-TOL is run for ‘N’ times and DPs and FRs are 
recorded for each run.  
Step III: Select critical Design Parameters based on 
Surrogate Modelling of Dimensional Variations- 
    Based on the observations of variation simulation, this step 
develops a surrogate model of DPs dimensional variations 
which expresses FRs as response of the DPs. The surrogate 
model can be represented as follows, 
FRk=fk(DP1, DP2,… DPp)                                                      (4) 
 k=1,2,…,n. 
Since the DPs operates non-linearly, surrogate model up to dth 
order with interactions is considered, where d 1t . Any term in 
the surrogate model can be represented as 
1 2
1 2 pww wl pt DP DP ...DP                                                           (5) 
where,  1 2 pw w ... w dc      d 1,2,...,dc  . 
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The surrogate model of Equation 4 is trained using data on 
FRs and DPs generated by variation simulation of Step II. The 
model is fitted by minimizing residual sum square (RSS) error 
using Least Squares Regression. For FRk, RSS based on full 
training data is given as and using set of terms T to build the 
surrogate model is given by, 
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where FRkj and kjˆFR are training and fitted values 
respectively. For developing surrogate model of nth order, all 
terms lower order terms are selectively added to the model 
before considering higher order terms. Terms are entered in 
the model through Forward selection-Backward elimination 
method [15]. The criteria for selection and elimination of a 
term are the decrease in mean prediction error (MPEk) upon 
inclusion or exclusion of the term. MPEk is determined by v-
fold cross-validation [16], which divides training data in v 
folds. Surrogate model is trained using data from all but one 
fold. RSS is calculated based on the fold, which is left out for 
model training. For a model based on a set of terms T, mean 
prediction error is denoted as TkMPE .  
If T is a set of terms selected so far, a new term t is 
selected if T {t} TkkMPE MPE
  . Similarly, term t T, is 
eliminated if T {t} TkkMPE MPE
  . Therefore, Forward 
selection-Backward elimination process will end with critical 
terms left in the final set T. DPs appearing in one or more 
terms of final set T are critical ones.  
Step IV: Determine sensitivity of faulty FRs on critical DPs- 
Sensitivity analysis is done by taking partial derivative of 
faulty FRs on critical DPs. The surrogate model of 
dimensional variations, obtained from previous step, is an 
analytical response function for FRs in terms of DPs. The 
function ‘f’ is derivable for all DPs over the domain defined 
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 k=1,2,…,n and i=1,2,…,p. 
4. Industrial Case Study 
The Root Cause Analysis (RCA) methodology is 
demonstrated by a case study on automotive ignition switch. 
Fig. 3 presents an exploded view of ignition switch showing 
the individual parts 1-5.  
 
Fig. 3. Exploded view of ignition switch with individual parts 1-5 
A direct customer complaint is ‘Sticky key’ whereby 
ignition switch lacks a free feel of operation when turned 
clockwise or anti-clockwise. When the key is turned from 
Ignition to Start position, it is incapable of returning to 
Ignition once released.  Overstay of the key at the Start 
position also allows excessive current to flow through starter 
motor resulting in ‘Starter motor burnout’, which is an 
electro-mechanical failure i.e. consequential electrical failure 
caused by dimensional variations of internal components of 
the ignition switch. Therefore for ‘Starter motor burnout’ 
cases both starter motor and ignition switch are replaced by 
service centres. 
The steps of the RCA methodology are described as 
follows: 
Step I: Identify faulty Functional Requirements- 
  Warranty data is analysed to find Sticky Key’ and ‘Start 
motor burnout’ incidents reported by customers and 
components replaced by service centres. Ignition switch is 
found to be replaced for both issues. Ishikawa diagram of 
‘Sticky key’ problem as shown in Fig. 4 identifies 
misalignment of stator within the body.  
 
Fig. 4. Ishikawa diagram of ‘Stick key’ failure in ignition switch 
X-Ray Computer Tomography (CT) scanning of faulty 
ignition switch shows that misalignment of stator within the 
body causes lock to cam interference [13]. This is illustrated 
in Fig. 5. 
 
   
Fig. 5. Lock & cam interference due to stator (Chetan et. al, 2012) [13] 
Therefore, the gap between lock and cam is the geometric FR, 
which in case of clearance allows free rotation of cam inside 
the lock but causes ‘Sticky key’ issue in case of interference.  
Step II: Conduct Variation Simulation of Design Parameters 
& faulty Functional Requirements-  
    Nominal CAD of the ignition switch is referred to develop 
datum flow chain, which is shown in Fig 6. Fab are geometric 
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features that affect assembly joints J 1-8. The faulty FR is 
joint J4. Let (α, β, γ) be the rotational DPs and (Δx, Δy, Δz) be 
the translational DPs for any identified critical feature. For 
example, feature F42, is modelled as a cylindrical feature with 
two DPs: (i) rotation about Y-axis (βF42); and (ii) rotation 
about Z-axis (γF42), given the cam cylinder axis is parallel to 
X-axis of global co-ordinate frame in the CAD model. 
    The gap between cam and lock is further modelled as two 
geometric FRs: (i) FR1 – Upper clearance at the top of the 
cam; and (ii) FR2 – Lower clearance at the bottom of the cam. 
VRM is run 3000 times simulating DPs, FR1 and FR2. 
Negative values of clearance indicate interference, which 
causes jamming in the lock and cam. 
 
    
Fig. 6. Datum Flow Chain of Ignition switch (Chetan et. al, 2012) [13] 
  Step III: Select critical Design Parameters based on 
Surrogate Modelling of Dimensional Variations- 
The case study considers surrogate model up to 2nd order 
(d=2). Forward selection-backward elimination method 
selects critical DPs based on Mean Prediction Error, which is 
determined by 5 fold cross-validation. The final surrogate 
models are build using the critical DPs as shown in Eqs. 9 and 
10. 
u  5 F421 F431.16 10 1.61 1.63FR E E  
      F 43 F11 F 43( 2.47 4.66 )E E E                                      (9)          
 
 u   4 F42 2 F434.22 10 1.58 1.56FR E E    
           ' '  'F11 F 21 F 21 F 53x ( 37.01 x 45.91 x )E                    (10) 
Table 1 summarizes the results of Surrogate Modelling of 
Dimensional Variations. 
Table 1. Results of Surrogate Modelling of Dimensional Variations 
Functional 
Requirement 
No. of Total 
/Critical DPs 
Critical DPs RSS 
Upper 
clearance (FR1) 





24/5 F11E , F21' , F42E , F43E & 
F53'  
0.759 
Fig. 7(a) and (b) shows the surrogate models with respect 
to two DPs, keeping the rest as constant at their mean values.  
Isolines of the surrogate models are shown in Fig. 8(a) & (b).  
Step IV: Determine sensitivity of faulty FRs on critical DPs-  
Sensitivity analysis is done based on partial derivatives of the 
surrogate model with respect to (w.r.t) DPs. Examples of 
partial derivatives of FR1 and FR2 is given in Eqs. 11 and 12. 
1 F43 F11 F43FR / 1.63 2.47 9.32E E Ew w                           (11) 
2 F 21 F11 F 21 F53FR / x (74.02 x 45.91 x )Ew w'  '  '                (12)   
Equations 11 and 12 permits sensitivity analysis over a 
continuous domain and therefore give greater flexibility than 
point-based approach [13]. 
 
Fig. 7(a). Surrogate Model of Lock & Cam Upper Clearance 
 
Fig. 7(b). Surrogate Model of Lock & Cam Lower Clearance 
 
Fig. 8(a). Isolines of Surrogate Model of Lock & Cam Upper Clearance 
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Fig. 8(b). Isolines of Surrogate Model of Lock & Cam Lower Clearance 
Discussion of Results- The significance of the results of the 
case study is discussed in the context of the objectives of the 
RCA methodology as follows: 
x Identification of critical DPs affecting faulty FRs – The 
surrogate modelling approach narrowed down to 3 and 5 
critical DPs from a total of 24 for FR1 and FR2 
respectively. Reducing number of DPs is crucial as 
tolerance re-allocation incurs cost, which will be less 
when lesser DPs are adjusted. 
x Sensitivity Analysis of faulty FRs w.r.t critical DPs- The 
surrogate models expresses the faulty FRs as analytical 
response functions of critical DPs. This allows sensitivity 
analysis over a continuous domain. This provides greater 
flexibility than point-based sensitivity analysis [13] in 
adjusting tolerances by setting constraints. 
In summary, the outcome of the proposed methodology is a 
significant input for corrective actions via design adjustments. 
Information about critical Design Parameters (DPs) and 
analytical surrogate model of faulty Functional Requirements 
(FRs) will enable cost-driven optimization on critical DPs to 
determine mean shift and tolerance reduction of DPs, which 
minimize production yield of faulty FRs. 
5. Conclusion & Future Work 
The RCA methodology described in this paper provides a 
systematic approach of addressing service failures by 
integrating warranty data and design models. Future work can 
utilize the results of this paper in the following ways: 
x The effect of dimensional variations of DPs on FRs is 
represented by analytical closed-form surrogate models, 
which can be developed offline. Therefore, surrogate 
models are computationally efficient alternative to 
variation simulation in applications that require frequent 
execution of the later. 
x For service failures, corrective actions such as design 
optimization, tolerance reallocation significantly benefit 
from identification of critical DPs and sensitivity analysis 
of faulty FRs over continuous domain providing. The 
current methodology can be extended to generation of 
corrective action by optimal tolerance reallocation. 
x The current work can also be extended for process control 
which also has same requirements as the proposed RCA 
methodology viz. (i) closed-form representation of 
relation between product features and control parameters; 
(ii) selection of critical control parameters; and   
(iii) sensitivity analysis of product features w.r.t critical 
control features. 
Overall, the approach of surrogate modelling of dimensional 
variations of control parameters such as DPs in design stage 
has potentially significant applications in RCA and CA of 
service failures as well other design and manufacturing 
related tasks. 
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